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ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES OF REGULATION-
THE TREND IN VIRGINIA
MICHAEL J. ILEO* AND DAVID C. PAtCELL**
The Virginia State Corporation Commission, like all other utility
regulatory agencies, is charged with the responsibility of insuring' that
utilities which operate under its jurisdiction function in accordance with
the goal of promoting the economic welfare of society.1 The ful-
fillment of this objective is perhaps the most difficult task faced by any
public body, for it involves the resolution of issues as complex as the
economic system itself. In order to develop an understanding of the
economic role of the SCC, this Article will analyze significant aspects
of the promotion of the general economic welfare and the economic
objectives of utility regulation.
COMPETITION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
A long-standing tenet of this country's economic system is that indi-
viduals should be free to exercise their property rights within reasonable
bounds and on an equal basis. The freedom to exercise such rights
naturally was extended to business organizations, for they represent the
collective economic interests of individuals. Property rights of business
organizations form the basis of competitive capitalism. One noted econ-
omist suggests that capitalism and democracy are inseparable, for both
require that individuals or firms be free to function independently on
an equal basis.2
Freedom to exercise property rights independently implies that busi-
ness firms will compete in the marketplace. Competition develops be-
cause each firm seeks to promote its own economic interest-typically
the maximization of profits or present worth. In order to accomplish
*President, Technical Associates, Incorporated, Consulting Economists.
** Vice President, Technical Associates, Incorporated, Consulting Economists.
1. Unlike most regulatory agencies, the authority of the Virginia State Corporation
Commission transcends a particular facet or area of regulation, for it possesses broad
powers over many aspects of business enterprise in the State; therefore, it plays a
prominent role in the economy of Virginia. Since a complete discussion of the economic
objectives of all aspects of the regulatory powers of the SCC would require a lengthy
presentation, this Article will consider only the objectives of public utility regulation.
2. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FRmoar (1965).
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this objective, a firm normally will seek to develop new technologies,
new products, cost-minimization techniques, and other innovations, which
will enable it to compete more effectively with its rivals. Thus, com-
petition results in a market situation where consumers are able to pur-
chase goods at a price consistent with the costs of production, and where
costs provide for a fair return on the resources utilized in the produc-
tive process. In this manner, competition among private companies
seeking to promote their own interests also promotes the economic inter-
ests of society at large as if guided by an "invisible hand." 3 Society's
interests are promoted because competition fosters cost-minimization
and efficient resource utilization.
Within the competitive model, no firm could grow to a size where
it could exert undue influence on pricing and output decisions in the
marketplace. This is true because perfect competition requires every
economic agent in the market to be so small relative to the market as
a whole that it cannot exert a perceptible influence on price. Under a
competitive framework, with limitations on size, a firm could neither
secure the entire market, nor utilize such a position to exploit consumers.
With the emergence of public utilities, it was soon recognized that
technology would not restrict the size of the firm because the costs of
production would decline as the size of the firm increased. Public util-
ities have significant economies of scale so that one firm can provide
service to a market at a lower cost than two or more competing firms.
Since there were few constraints on the size of a utility, a single utility
could serve an entire market; thus, the firm possessed the inherent monop-
olistic capability to exploit consumers, a capability not present in the
competitive model. Moreover, with economies of scale, entry into a
market by a competing utility would be exceedingly difficult and costly.
Further, if accomplished, such entry and the resultant duplication of
facilities might result in an inefficient use of society's resources.
In essence, public utilities do not fit the mold of competitive firms
because of their inherent tendency toward bigness and natural monopoly
which is fostered in part by economies of scale. With the absence
of restrictions on size and the ensuing development of uncontrolled
economic power, unregulated public utility enterprise was not thought
to be in the public interest. In order to insure that society would reap
some of the benefits of economies of scale and that economic power
3. A. S-TH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1910).
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would not be used to society's detriment, a consensus developed which
urged governmental control of the rates and services provided by public
utilities. In a sense, "[t]he visible hand of public regulation was to
replace the invisible hand of Adam Smith in order to protect consumers
against extortionate charges, restriction of output, deterioration of serv-
ice, and unfair discrimination." 4 This basic philosophy provided the
thrust for the development of the regulatory system in the United States
and the creation of regulatory agencies such as Virginia's State Cor-
poration Commission.
COMPETITION VERSUS REGULATION
Early regulation of public utilities reflected a belief that the comped-
tive mechanism could not be relied on to protect the public interest.
Essentially, it was theorized that a competitive market involving utili-
ties could not survive and would fail to promote the general economic
welfare. But this did not mean that regulation would alter the compet-
itive norm for utilities. On the contrary, the primary objective of
regulation was-and still is-to produce market results in the utility
sectors of the economy closely approximating those conditions which
would obtain if utility rates and services were determined competitively.
Although it is well recognized that no form of economic regulation
can ever be a perfect surrogate for competition in determining market
prices for goods and services, there is nearly "unanimous acceptance of
the theory that the goal of regulation should be to act as a substitute
for the competitive marketplace, with economic efficiency as the ulti-
mate test of effectiveness." 5 In order to meet this objective, regulatory
agencies were granted control over competition between utilities, entry
into and exit from utility markets, consolidation and acquisitions, financ-
ing requirements, the nature and quality of- service, and utility rates.
The most important function of the regulatory agency is the deter-
mination of utility rates and, hence, utility profits. As regulation is
substituted for competition, administrative rate control replaces the com-
petitive pricing mechanism which provides the signaling device by
which firms decide to expand or contract output, offer new services,
retract or change existing services, enter or leave a market, and make
4. Adams, The Role of Competition in the Regulated Industries, 48 Am. EcoN. REv.,
May, 1958.
5. P. Rosoff, E. Lowry & E. Wirth, The Role of the Economist in Regulatory De-
cision-Making, May, 1972 (unpublished mimeograph available from author).
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other decisions. Prices in conjunction with costs determine the profit-
ability of a firm's operation generally or in a particular line of com-
merce. If profits increase in a particular market as a result of a rise in
price, competitive firms will react by expanding output in that market
in order to increase profits. In other words, the competitive pricing
mechanism serves to inform firms as to the existence of shortages and
surpluses and, hence, functions to allocate resources among competing
uses.
The theoretical competitive model envisioned by economists provides
the general norm by which the appropriateness of the level of utility
rates or prices can be ascertained. In a competitive market which is
in long-run equilibrium, price will be at a level identical to long-run
marginal and average cost, where cost is defined to include a fair return
on capital employed. When a market reaches competitive equilibrium,
the price reflects the full cost of production, including the value of
resources utilized and the value consumers place on the corresponding
product. When such a situation exists, resources are allocated in an
efficient manner, thereby enabling society to achieve the most productive
use of its resources consistent with consumer demand.
Based on the competitive model, the general economic objective of
utility regulation has been the provision of adequate service and the
establishment of rates which provide a utility the opportunity to cover
all costs including a fair return on the capital or rate base employed.
Such rates are consistent with the competitive norm and achieve, in a
sense, an equitable economic balance between the specific interests of
the firm and the consuming public-the balance implicitly envisioned by
the "invisible hand."
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that regulators need only
be concerned with equating price to average cost in order to achieve the
objectives of regulation as found in the competitive model. Sound reg-
ulatory practice requires a great deal more. Yet, despite the fact that
competition and a regulatory system in its image are far more intricate
mechanisms than is indicated by the determination of a general rate
which reflects costs and a fair return, it is only within recent times
that regulators have begun to scrutinize the complexities of the regula-
tory system. This is not to say that regulators were reluctant to assume
the burdensome responsibilities necessary to achieve the competitive
norm. Rather, history indicates that regulators initially were required to
resolve questions dealing more with procedural and organizational issues.
[Vol. 14:547
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In large part these issues have been resolved.6 Now, with the rise of the
consumer movement and the consequent interest in the regulatory
process, the greater understanding of the objectives of regulation, and
the availability of procedures by which the performance of the regula-
tory process can be assessed, regulators are assuming the mounting
responsibilities associated with meeting the economic objectives of reg-
ulation. Consequently, regulators are now concerned chiefly with the
purpose and results of regulation, rather than its procedural problems.
EMERGING ROLE OF THE ECoNOMIsT
Perhaps the most striking evidence of the new trend toward an in-
creasing level of technical sophistication embodied in the regulatory
process is the emerging role of the economist. Not very long ago, pro-
fessional economists had little, if any, direct impact on the outcome of
regulatory proceedings. This situation was unusual when it is consid-
ered that economists had developed much of the theoretical justifica-
tion for the creation of the regulatory system and had provided some
of the structural guidelines for its operation. Although the regulatory
system is a process governed by law, it nevertheless was designed to
function as an economic system.
In contrast to the situation which prevailed several years ago, the
role of the economist in regulatory matters has assumed increased im-
portance.7 In today's regulatory proceeding, it is not unusual to find
economists sitting beside counsel for commission staffs, intervenors
or protestants, as well as the applicant. Although the economist is con-
cerned principally with the presentation of expert testimony, he fre-
quently assists counsel in the development of cross-examination and in
the preparation of the entire case.
The dimensions and various aspects of this changing role have been
articulated by several noted writers in the economic arena:
The economist, as an expert, has been playing an ever-increasing
role in regulatory hearings .... Traditionally, he has appeared in
rate of return cases, for utilities and for regulatory agencies. Con-
6. These non-economic issues include the structure and operations of the regulatory
agency and the requirements of due process-investigations, notices, hearings, analysis
of the record, findings, orders, and appeals.
7. Generally, this trend is national in scope, but it applies to hearings before the Com-
mission as well. Even in cases involving the smallest utilities, one typically finds the
presentation of expert economic testimony.
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tinuing to do this, he is now finding increasing call upon his serv-
ices in proceedings related to pricing, rate levels, rate structure,
competition and related matters.8
The greater prominence of economists in regulatory proceedings results
from the broader issues being studied by regulatory agencies in recent
years: "The increased incidence of proceedings containing issues which
require more attention from economists may reflect the changing char-
acter of regulation brought about by the changing nature and diversi-
fication of utility operations." 9
It has been suggested that the economist's expanded role in rate pro-
ceedings was initiated with what has been termed the "administrative
phase" of rate regulations: "The Hope Natural Gas case of 1944 marks
the beginning of the administrative phase.... The Supreme Court held
that the procedure and method of determining both the rate base and
the rate of return should be left to the Commission." 10 The Hope deci-
sion imposed an expanded burden on regulatory agencies, since it meant
that commissioners had to be informed and advised more completely
as to the objectives of regulation. Thus, the role of the economist was
expanded in order to assist regulatory agencies in meeting this added
responsibility. 1 Alfred Kahn offers the following reflection: "The
most important thing the Hope Natural Gas decision did was to invite
regulatory commissions to break out of the mold into which they had
been confined for forty-five years by Smyth v. Ames and start thinking
about the economic requirements of effective public utility regulation. "12
For several years after Hope, questions concerning the determination
of rate base received the bulk of attention from regulatory agencies.
This development is changing: "While the property valuation problem
has received too much emphasis, determination of the rate of return has
received too little. In recent years, however, the combined effects of
the Hope decision and of inflation have been to shift regulatory atten-
8. Lapinsky, The Role of the Economist in Regulatory Hearings, 90:8 PuB. UTm.
FORTNImGrLY 37 (1972).
9. Id.
10. C. PHmLLIPS, THE EcoNoMIcs OF REGULATION 133 (1969).
11. The Hope decision is generally thought to have initiated the "end-result" test:
Fair and reasonable rates were those rates which were consistent with the competitive
norm. Regulators became responsible for determining such rates and, thus, the expertise
of professionals was required. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
12. Kahn, Inducements to Superior Performance Price, in PERFORMANCE UNDER RaU-
LATION 88 (H. Trebing ed. 1968).
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tion from the rate base to the rate of return." 1 The growing emphasis
on the rate of return concept, of course, was primarily responsible for
the emergence of the economist in regulatory proceedings. It is only
natural that an economist should be consulted since his training and ex-
pertise are aptly suited for an evaluation of the many economic consid-
erations which are important in determining a fair rate of return for a
particular utility at any point in time.
There is every indication that the economist's role will continue to
expand. One author has asserted that:
As to the increasing importance of economists and econometrics
in regulation, there can be little dispute. Because of the changing
nature and diversification of utility operations, regulation has
changed greatly in recent years. Return on rate base has given
way to return on capital; and marginal rates are the wave of the
future.14
The outlook for the economist's role in regulatory proceedings is even
brighter than in the recent past:
Perhaps the best way to prove this general conclusion is to
survey attorneys who practice in the relevant field of law, as to
their awareness and use of economic theory and analysis. It is not
too bold to suggest that attorneys' locker room talk now includes
long-run incremental cost, cross-elasticities, and other such eco-
nonic terms. .... 15
This view is shared by other authorities who have indicated that profes-
sional economists should play a far greater role in the regulatory process
than they do now; they suggest that lawyers might have to allow econo-
mists to participate more fully in regulatory proceedings.' One author
notes that, in order to bring about improvement in the general regulatory
area, "there is a need to rid the process of legalistic thinking... and to
inject effective economic analysis of costs and demand into the
system." '1
13. C. PHmLmpS, supra note 10, at 260.
14. Welch, Are Lawyers Wrecking Regulations?, 90:8 PuB. Unm. FoRT N TY 7
(1972).
15. Lapinsky, supra note 8, at 40.
16. Donahue, Lawyers, Economists, and the Regulated Industries: Thoughts on Pro-
fessional Roles by Some Recent Economic Literature, 70 Micm. L. Rav. 195-200 (1971).
17. Massel, The Regulatory Process and Public Utility Performance, in PmFORMANCE
UNDER R -ULATON 126 (H. Trebing ed. 1968).
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EcoNoMics OF REGULATION
The emerging role of the economist in the regulatory process reflects
a changing and maturing pattern of utility regulation. It is appropriate
to make a tripartite inquiry: what has caused a need for economic
analysis; what are these technical economic issues which face regula-
tors; and have the tasks which confront regulators truly become more
complex? In some respects the issues are no more complex than they
were at the dawn of regulation. The new emphasis simply represents
a deeper understanding of fundamental issues and their complexities.
However, in other respects, the issues are new and more complex than
ever before. In order to answer these questions fully, attention must
again turn to a consideration of the competitive model, the normative
exemplar of regulation. In this regard, the following five areas will
be examined: (1) equilibrium price levels; (2) absence of discriminatory
pricing; (3) freedom of market entry; (4) managerial and technological
efficiency; and (5) efficient resource allocation.
Equilibrium Price Levels
Competitive market equilibrium provides the norm for the determina-
tion of fair utility rates. Such equilibrium is attained when a market
clears, that is, when neither a surplus nor a shortage prevails in the
market.is The price which accompanies such a market condition is
defined as an equilibrium price-a price at which the product demand
of consumers is matched exactly by the product offered for sale by
suppliers. At competitive equilibrium, market price stabilizes at a level
which provides firms with revenues sufficient to cover operating ex-
penses and capital costs, including a return to equity investors com-
mensurate with the "opportunity cost" of equity capital-the return
which could be earned by the equity investor in an alternative invest-
ment prospect of comparable risk.
When shortages or surpluses emerge in a competitive market (dis-
tortions at a disequilibrium price), competitive forces are set into motion
which correct the distortions. For example, a surplus exists when market
price is greater than the equilibrium price so that suppliers are anxious
to sell more products than consumers are willing to buy. Since producers
18. In electric utility industries, a surplus indicates excess capacity, that is, the ability




are unable to sell all their products at the existing price, firms will com-
pete for sales, thereby bidding the price down and driving it to
equilibrium. Conversely, market shortages are corrected by a similar
mechanism.
Forces are always acting to disturb existing market equilibriums and
to create new ones, with different equilibrium outputs, prices, and
demands. The market distortions (shortages and surpluses) which con-
stantly arise are eliminated continually in a never-ending manner by
the competitive price mechanism. Because of constantly changing tastes,
income levels, costs, technology, and many other economic as well
as social factors, competitive equilibrium must be viewed as a dynamic
as opposed to a static condition. Since regulation is a substitute for com-
petition, it should function in a dynamic manner as well.
One of the major criticisms of the regulatory process is that it has
functioned too slowly and has not been a dynamic process. Regulatory
lag often results in a situation where the rates, when finally determined,
are outdated and have no relationship to the current situation of a
utility. For example, it may take a utility three months to recognize
that its rates are inadequate, another three months to develop and file a
rate application, another three months for the rate hearing and order
to be issued, and yet another three months for the new rates to be insti-
tuted. Because a year has passed it is only remotely conceivable that
the new rates, based on a year-old situation, will reflect the utility's
current status; this may also aggravate an existing market distortion.
Moreover, an extended period in which market distortions prevail
serves only to retard general economic growth, misallocate society's
resources, encourage inefficiencies, and create other economic malfunc-
tions, all of which are detrimental to the interests of utilities and
consumers.
Because of the lack of procedural responsiveness in rate determina-
tions, it is likely that shortages and surpluses will continue to prevail
in markets for utility services. In order to correct market distortions,
the concepts of "annual review" and "continuous surveillance" have
been proposed for adoption in the regulatory process. Both concepts
envision a procedure by which regulatory agencies would be informed
continually as to the economic status of utilities under their jurisdic-
tions. Thus informed, regulators would be better equipped to correct
market distortions as they arise in a manner analogous to that contem-
plated in the competitive model.
1973]
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The State Corporation Commission recognized quite clearly the
problems created by the absence of a continual process of regulation.
Accordingly, the Commission adopted a formal and comprehensive sys-
tem of annual review. The system requires that utilities file various
economic and accounting data on an annual basis, including data on
past operations and estimates of future conditions.19 In the words of the
Commission:
The system of annual review called for is viewed by the Vir-
ginia Commission as an integral part of its continuing efforts to
improve the responsiveness and quality of regulation in Virginia
... Since the Virginia Commission will be in a position to deal
promptly with difficulties as they arise, all interests will be better
served. Virginia consumers will be better protected against the
possibility of excessive rates and inadequate service because this
Commission will possess the continual stream of information neces-
sary for such a determination. On the other hand, utilities will be
better protected against the possibility of rates which are inade-
quate and detrimental to their financial integrity .... 20
The adoption of annual review will provide the SCC with the data
necessary to function harmoniously with the economic objectives of
regulation, since the continuous process of regulation will more closely
mirror the dynamics of competition. Rate adjustments can be made to
correct shortages, surpluses, and malfunctions which result from ex-
tended periods of disequilibrium.
The adoption and implementation of annual review requires the SCC
and its staff to assume additional burdens. A continuing process of reg-
ulation necessarily implies that cost analyses of utilities must be con-
ducted much more frequently. In addition, debt and equity costs must
be reviewed continually to gauge changes in the cost of capital. The
proper handling of these responsibilities will require that the SCC be
provided with additional resources and personnel. However, the benefits
to be derived from annual review, both for consumers and utilities,
will far exceed the marginal increase in costs necessary to accomplish
the objective of maintaining equilibrium price levels. Obviously, these
19. The data includes actual and projected capital structure, debt cost, equity costs,
and other information. See Letter from Commissioners Catterall, Bradshaw and Shannon





additional responsibilities necessitate a greater reliance on the technical
expertise of accountants, engineers and economists.
Absence of Discriminatory Pricing
Under conditions of competitive equilibrium, prices in each market
reflect an equality with long-run marginal and average costs, including
a fair return on capital employed. When price exceeds average cost,
firms are able to earn profits in excess of a fair return. Excess profits
provide the signaling device which stimulates the productivity of present
firms and attracts additional firms to a market, thereby increasing output,
reducing price, and eliminating excess profits. In other words, under
competition, excess profits are eliminated by increases in the output of
existing firms and by the entry of new firms. Conversely, when price
is lower than average cost, firms leave the market and output diminishes.
In monopolistic markets, the threat of market entry from new firms
is minimal, so that a monopolistic firm is able to charge a price in excess
of average cost. The use of monopoly power, which results in excess
profits, causes harm to consumers and society generally.
Utilities typically possess monopoly power. For example, electric
utilities are granted exclusive territorial franchises. In addition, in some
product markets (lighting, for example) there are virtually no substi-
tutes for electric power except in the case of a customer-owned gen-
erating facility. Because of the resultant absence of any serious threat
of actual or potential competition, in either geographical or product
markets, utilities have the capability to engage in monopolistic pricing.
In other geographical and product markets, utilities face competition.
In the heating markets, for example, gas and electric utilities compete
for business. Under such circumstances, it is conceivable that utilities
will engage in predatory pricing; that is, they might establish a price
which is less than long-run marginal or average cost. Since no new
firm could compete effectively with the existing producer, predatory
pricing operates to foreclose potential competition. The existing price
yields less than a fair return which, obviously, discourages the entry
of prospective firms.
Both monopolistic and predatory pricing are forms of price discrim-
ination. It is quite possible that a utility could engage in both forms of
discriminatory pricing and still maintain revenues just sufficient to yield
an overall fair return. In essence, the revenues generated by monopo-
19731
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
listic pricing policies would subsidize the markets where predatory
pricing practices yield something less than a fair return. Although the
collective revenues of the utility are sufficient to cover overall operating
and capital costs, these revenue requirements are raised in an inequitable
manner-utilizing a cost of service basis-among ratepayers, since an
inequality exists between costs and prices. Just as with the establish-
ment of disequilibrium prices, discriminatory pricing produces market
distortions and their attendant adverse economic effects.
Although the extent of discriminatory pricing among utilities is sub-
ject to question, the fact that it exists is generally accepted. Typically,
it is referred to as "value of service" pricing;21 it has been justified on
bases other than costs and a fair return.22 Although there may be good
reason for using value of service or discriminatory pricing, the practice
is at odds with the competitive norm. Despite this, such practices rarely
have been analyzed by regulatory agencies. FCC Commissioner Ken-
neth Cox has noted:
Traditionally, pricing problems have not been at the forefront
of Federal Communications Commission activity; even today such
issues as the fair rate of return, revenue requirements, and juris-
dictional separations standards tend to take precedence over issues
raised by particular pricing problems. Under the statewide theory
of rate making, state commissions rarely address problems relating
to the specific pricing practices of the communications common
carriers.23
21. An example of value of service pricing may be considered. Suppose the costs of
providing telephone service to a household and to a law firm are identical. However,
since attorneys transact a great deal of business by telephone and their incomes are de-
pendent on the availability and quality of telephone service, it is felt that telephone
service is more valuable to a law firm. Hence, telephone rates charged law firms might
be greater than those charged households despite the equivalence of costs.
Another example would be the case of an electric company charging very large
power users rates which are lower than the costs of providing the service. The value of
service is less because a large user has the ability to install its own power generating
facilities. For a thorough examination of -discriminatory pricing, see J. BoNmuRGir, PaiN-
ciPL s oF PuBuc UnLrrY RAxTs 369-85 (1969).
22. Suppose the poor are charged rates lower than the costs to serve them. Suppose
rates in a particular geographic area are kept low in order to promote economic growth
and full employment. These practices are difficult to condemn. But many economists
would argue that regulators should not be in the business of resolving questions con-
cerned with social welfare.
23. Cox, An Appraisal of Regulatory Policies in Conmiunications, in EssAys oN PuB-
Mc UTILITY PRICING AND REGuLATIoN 317-18 (H. Trebing ed. 1971).
[Vol. 14:547
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Even if regulatory agencies allow value of service pricing, there never-
theless should be some inquiry into its justification, the nature and
purpose of the discrimination, its deviation from competitive pricing,
and its economid impact. The compilation of data necessary for such
an analysis is termed a cost of service study, a procedure which deter-
mines the cost of serving different geographical markets and customer
classes within such markets. Utility rates set in accordance with a cost
of service philosophy closely parallel non-discriminatory prices which
would exist under competitive conditions.
Regulatory agencies have not considered specific pricing problems be-
cause of the extreme difficulties of conducting a complete cost of service
study. First, only the major utilities have the resources and technical
expertise essential for the accumulation of the necessary data by service
categories. Second, the costs of such an undertaking are often staggering.
This view was articulated in a recent communication by the SCC re-
garding its proposal to the Federal Price Commission:
Regarding the assignment of costs to service categories in pro-
forming operating expenses, this Commission believes it would be
unreasonable and impractical to compel all fixed and transportation
utilities which will be bound by the terms of this proposal to per-
form a full-scale and precisely designated cost of service study in
rate applications. While this Commission reserves the right to re-
quire utilities to perform and present the findings of a cost of
service study in rate applications, it has exercised its prerogative
only when the circumstances warranted a cost of service study
because of the considerable cost, time, and complexity of such an
undertaking. The continuance of this policy is proposed by this
Commission. Therefore, when in this Commission's judgment,
the assignment of costs to service categories is reasonably possible
of determination and such information is necessary for this Com-
mission to render a decision in accordance with the terms of its
proposal, this Commission will require that a cost of service study
be performed by the applicant and will determine the nature and
precision of that study as conditions warrant.
24
Clearly, while the SCC acknowledges the usefulness of cost of service
studies, it also recognizes the time, information, and cost constraints on
the performance of such undertakings.
24. Commissioners' Letter, supra note 19, at 6.
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A cost of service study and its subsequent rate analysis requires
greater technical expertise than any study project in regulatory eco-
nomics. But the accounting, engineering, and economic expertise neces-
sary to perform such studies does exist and, therefore, it will no longer
suffice to argue that technological expertise is unavailable. There re-
mains, however, a second obstacle. Regulators must be provided with
the additional staff and resources necessary to conduct cost of service
studies. Such support will be forthcoming only if the current public
interest in regulatory efficiency represents more than just a whim. In-
deed, economists argue that such support is essential if fundamental
objectives of regulation are to be realized.
Freedom of Market Entry
In a competitive environment, firms are attracted to new markets
because they believe that such a venture will be profitable. If the pro-
spective entrant is able to enter a market with a new technology or
cost-minimization technique, his cost of production will be less than
that of existing firms. Therefore, the new firm's price will be lower
than the existing market price, and consumers will realize the benefits
of the technological advance.
When discriminatory pricing of a predatory nature is utilized in
utility markets, entry is restricted and tecnological innovation is retarded.
When market price is lower than current production costs, prospective
entrants have little incentive to develop cost-saving techniques which
will enable them to enter the market on a competitive basis. For ex-
ample, consider the following situation: Suppose a new firm is formed
which would install and operate electric generating facilities for large
industrial and commercial customers at a cost lower than that currently
incurred. Clearly, the entry of the new firm should be encouraged be-
cause it has favorable competitive attributes. However, if existing elec-
tric rates were set on a predatory basis-that is, designed specifically to
forestall potential competition in this market-the new firm would never
materialize and the cost-saving technology would be lost to society.
Any firm, utilities included, is able to price on a predatory basis in
some markets if it is able to charge monopolistic prices in other markets.
This is the only way the firm can generate revenues sufficient to main-
tain an adequate level of profitability. Thus, the maintenance of dis-
criminatory pricing schemes-part monopolistic, part predatory-inhibits
[Vol. 14:547
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potential competition and retards the pace of economic progress to
the detriment of society generally. One writer has argued that:
[T]he experiments in public regulation during the last two
decades have been singularly unsuccessful in that the creation of
a fourth branch of government has, in many cases, resulted in
undue restriction of entry, encouragement of mergers and con-
solidations, sanction for anticompetitive rate and service agree-
ments, erosion of interindustry competition, and suppression of
unregulated competition.25
Twelve years later, a similar view was expounded by the President's
Council of Economic Advisors: "Regulation has too often resulted in
protecting... the status quo. Entry is often blocked, prices are kept
from falling, and the industry becomes inflexible and insensitive to new
techniques and opportunities for progress." 26 Restrictions on entry,
whether emanating from predatory pricing practices or from the reluc-
tance of regulators to issue certificates of public convenience and neces-
sity, must be discouraged. This important regulatory goal can be real-
ized only when cost of service data can be developed on both existing
and prospective firms.
Managerial and Technological Efficiency
Implicit in improved efficiency is the understanding that a business
enterprise is able to produce the same output with fewer resources or
greater output with existing resources. In essence, improved efficiency
means increased resource productivity. Firms which function under
competitive market conditions are encouraged to improve efficiency
through the introduction of cost-minimization techniques and techno-
logical advances. This encouragement results from an ever present com-
petitive factor-the possibility that an existing or potential rival will
introduce cost-saving technology and thereby gain a competitive ad-
vantage. The competitive firm is, therefore, compelled to seek more
efficient production techniques, for it continually confronts the pos-
sibility that its market position will be eroded by a rival. Efficient pro-
duction benefits consumers by allowing lower prices. In addition, cost-
25. Adams, supra note 4, at 258.
26. 1970 EcoNoamic REPORT oF THE PRESIDENT 107.
27. Prospective entrants should also be required to show that they are indeed more
efficient and simply not engaging in predatory practices.
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savings techniques benefit the entire society to the extent that they
free resources to be used in other productive endeavors.
Within a regulated environment, the competitive impetus spurring
innovation is minimal because entry must remain at least semi-restricted
if economies of scale are to be realized. The innovative spirit must
emanate from the utilities themselves. Regulators can encourage tech-
nological advance by closely supervising utility costs and by insuring
that utilities are rewarded for developing and introducing new tech-
nologies.
There is clear evidence that the State Corporation Commission shares
this viewpoint. In the explanation of its annual review procedure re-
garding expense projection statements to be submitted by utilities, the
SCC stated:
The Commission will also allow utilities to pro-form other expenses
extending 12 months beyond the test period. Pro-formed expendi-
tures which are peripheral to actual operations, but are important
to the success of the utility, such as those for research, develop-
ment, safety, and environmental protection will be allowed by the
Commission, if in this Commission's judgment the expenditures are
adequately specified and are reasonable for the continued growth
of the utility and generally in the public interest. This Commis-
sion will not allow pro-formed expenditures which are of a pro-
motional or informational nature which are not supported by
tangible evidence that the utility is in fact doing what it claims. 28
If experience shows in a particular instance that a utility realized
greater expenses over the pro-formed period than anticipated, the
Virginia Commission will be provided with the information to
recommend that a new hearing be held to determine the cause of
the difficulty and if a rate increase is required. Conversely, the
same will be true if a utility experiences productivity gains which
were not provided for in the pro-forma adjustments which may
imply that a rate decrease is in order. However, this does not
mean that the Virginia Commission believes that all productivity
gains should accrue to consumers in the form of lower rates. On
the contrary, this Commission is of the view that the utility itself
should share in the benefits derived from increases in productivity
as a reward for instituting action which reduces the necessity for
rate increases in the future.29
28. Commissioners' Letter, supra note 19, at 6.




The price mechanism is the vehicle by which scarce resources in our
economy are allocated to alternative sources of employment. In com-
petitive industries, prices are determined by the free interplay of the
forces of supply and demand. The equilibrium prices which emerge as
a result of this process reflect the market value which consumers place
on the goods and services produced and the market value of the re-
sources utilized in producing these commodities. Since an equality ex-
ists between prices and costs, full production costs also reflect market
values. If, at any point in time, prices in a particular industry are at
a level which enables firms to exceed operating and capital costs, re-
sources will be attracted to the industry. With the influx of resources,
the output or supply of the industry will increase; this results in a re-
duction in price. Since the product will be more abundant, its value,
as well as the value of the resources used to produce it, will decrease.
Thus, the price mechanism has allocated resources in a manner to elim-
inate excessive profits and resulting excessive rates of return. When
resources are allocated in a manner such that they earn only a fair return
commensurate with the risk they bear, then they are being allocated
efficiently.
Competitive markets encourage an efficient allocation of resources.
Market distortions-product shortages or surpluses-are corrected con-
tinually by changes in prices which reallocate resources to eliminate
such distortions. In this regard, the regulatory process was designed to
be a surrogate for competition. When the resources devoted to public
utility enterprises are provided with the opportunity to earn only a fair
return, efficient resource allocation is encouraged and society can expect
that the supply of utility services will be equivalent to that which would
exist under competitive conditions.
The principal task of the regulatory- process is-to insure that the
resources available to society are allocated to the public utility sector
of the economy in an efficient manner. When resources are allocated
in an inefficient manner, society's resources are being squandered. For
example, if a power plant continually operates at only 10 percent of
capacity, the resources utilized in constructing and operating the plant
have been allocated inefficiently since they could have been employed
in some other market where output shortages prevail. On the other
hand, if the power plant is continually forced to operate in excess of
its designed capacity, additional resources should have been allocated
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to increase its output capabilities. Of all the problems which confront
regulatory agencies, questions concerning efficient resource allocation
are the most difficult to resolve. However, resources will be allocated
and utilized efficiently when equilibrium prices are constantly being set,
when there is an absence of discriminatory prices, when entry is en-
couraged, and when technological advances and cost-minimization tech-
niques are promoted. When all these objectives are realized, the goal
of efficient resource allocation will be achieved.
INFLATIONARY IMPACT OF RATE INCREASES
One economic aspect not previously discussed concerns the infla-
tionary impact of utility rate increases. The Commission notes:
One aspect of a regulatory framework without a definite pro-
vision for annual review is often overlooked. This centers on the
inflationary impact of public utility rate increases. Since utilities
appear infrequently before regulatory agencies for rate relief, they
typically will seek, when they do appear, rate increases which seem
inordinately large. Moreover, since the utilities view the regula-
tory process as a last resort, they typically are in need of a large
increase when they do appear. In recent years, this situation has
been particularly acute. Many utilities attempted to cope in-
ternally with the staggering pace at which inflation mounted. By
1971, however, most utilities found that despite their efforts in
1968, 1969, and 1970, the severity of inflation continually eroded
their profit positions. And as one would expect, not only was there
a rash of rate increase requests but they typically were for rather
large amounts.
Regulatory agencies, everywhere, were faced with exceedingly
difficult situations. On the one hand, as public agencies, they felt
an obligation to help curb the course of inflation. On the other
hand, they had an obligation to try to correct the deteriorating
financial conditions of many utilities. Since inflation had been
so severe, many utilities required large increases to maintain their
financial integrity, to maintain and improve the quality of service,
and to provide for growth and development. But the granting of
such large increases is inconsistent with the goal of curbing the
rate of inflation.
Under normal circumstances, public utility rate increases do not
contribute significantly to inflation. But the last several years have
not been normal. With virtually all utilities seeking large rate
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increases simultaneously, which in large part are justified, the infla-
tionary impact on the national economy would be considerable if
all requests are even partially granted. It would appear that the
Price Commission recognized this very difficult situation and took
steps to include utilities in the Economic Stabilization Program.
The task, however, of establishing guidelines to meet the goals of
regulation as well as the goals of national economic policy has been
left to the individual regulatory agencies.80
Minimization of the inflationary impact of utility rate increases is con-
sistent with the goals of sound regulatory practice. This follows because
firms in a competitive environment will seek to raise prices only as a
last resort, for they fear the loss of business to a rival which does not
raise price. Maintenance of equilibrium market prices through an annual
review procedure will serve to minimize the inflationary impact of
utility rate increases while accomplishing the other economic objectives.
CONCLUSION
For economists, it is refreshing to note that the SCC has instituted
procedures which should facilitate the accomplishment of the economic
objectives of regulation.31 Consumers as well as utilities should appre-
ciate that the SCC's new policies will be beneficial to the economy of
Virginia. However, these comments should not be interpreted to mean
that the SCC has gone as far as it should. There remain the questions
of actual attainment of equilibrium prices, elimination of market dis-
tortions, studies of price discrimination, promotion of efficiency, and
the ultimate test, allocation of resources. Annual review will provide
the vehicle and some of the data necessary to analyze and deal with these
complex economic issues. But there exists little doubt that additional
resources must be devoted to the regulatory process if all the objectives
of regulation are to be met. If the recent past can be viewed as indica-
tive of the future, then the prospects are good that these objectives will
be accomplished if sufficient resources are made available to the SCC
to facilitate thorough consideration of complex economic problems.
As regulators become more involved in analyzing the economic per-
formance of regulation and dealing with its economic complexities,
30. Id. at 8-10.
31. In the past, economists have led the critical charge against regulatory agencies.
See, e.g, W. SHmPHERD & T. GiEs, UvmnrY REGuLA-roN: NEW DmEcTIONS IN THEORY AND
POLICY (1967).
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economists and other professionals will find an increasing demand for
their expertise. This does not mean that economists have all the an-
swers or all the tools necessary to reach the answers. But the economist
does possess a keen understanding of the proper functioning of the
regulatory process and applicable analytical techniques. Moreover,
economists may gauge the performance of the regulatory process. In re-
cent times, for example, regulators have assumed increasing responsibility
for determining the environmental impact of utility operations and new
ventures. Economic tools such as cost-benefit analysis can be used to
develop dollar estimates of the costs and benefits of alternative invest-
ment projects. Such information will provide regulators with hard
economic data upon which decisions can be based.
Ultimately, the merits of any regulatory decision depends on the
judgment of regulators. If regulators are informed as to the objectives
of regulation, understand the complexities in reaching those objectives,
and are provided with the resources and expertise necessary to solve
problems and gauge the performance of regulation, then they will be
able to make decisions consistent with the goals of regulation. There
is every indication that this has been and is occurring in Virginia.
